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How Do Institutions Affect 
Structural Unemployment 
in Times of Crises? 
 
Summary: This paper examines the effect of economic crises on structural
unemployment using an Autoregressive Distributed Lags model and accounting
for the role of institutional settings on an unbalanced panel of 30 OECD 
economies from 1960 to 2006. We found that downturns have, on average, a
significant positive impact on the level of structural unemployment rate. The
maximum impact varies with the severity of the downturn. Institutions (such as 
employment protection legislation, average replacement ratio and product
market regulation) influence both the extent of the initial shock and the adjust-
ment pattern in the aftermath of an economic downturn.
Key words: Crisis, Structural unemployment, Institutions, Employment protec-
tion legislation. 
JEL: E62, H10.
 
 
 
There is now a broad consensus that the financial crisis has severely affected eco-
nomic growth and will continue to bear on prospects over the next few years. But the 
crisis is also likely to have long-lasting implications on productive capacity and fac-
tor inputs. Indeed, in past economic downturns the increase in cyclical unemploy-
ment has frequently led to higher structural unemployment, as defined as the unem-
ployment rate consistent with price stability. At the same time, the resilience of coun-
tries both in terms of the initial impact of the shock on the economy and the speed of 
recovery varies importantly depending on institutional settings. While several Euro-
pean countries experienced sustained rises in structural unemployment during past 
economic crises, these developments were much less pronounced in Anglo-Saxon 
economies.  
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this issue through an empirical 
analysis covering Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries. The main contribution of this paper is to estimate the impact of 
the economic downturns on structural unemployment while accounting for the role of 
labour and product market institutions.  
The main results of the paper are as follow: 
i) Crises are found to have, on average, a significant positive effect on the 
level of structural unemployment. The maximum impact is found to vary with the 
severity of the economic downturn. It could reach almost 1.5 percentage points after 
five years in the case of very deep economic downturns, while it would be around 0.6 
percentage points for crises of lower magnitude.   
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ii) The impact of banking and currency crises on structural unemployment 
does not appear to be fundamentally different from the effect of other economic 
downturns. 
iii) Institutions alter the impact of crises on structural unemployment by influ-
encing both the extent of the initial shock and the adjustment pattern in the aftermath 
of a crisis. This suggests that structural unemployment in countries with flexible la-
bour and product markets is likely to be relatively untouched by economic downturns 
while some sizeable increases in structural unemployment could be observed in other 
economies. 
iv) Countries where Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is high are 
likely to experience a marked rise in structural unemployment in the short and me-
dium term while low-EPL countries will see very little change. In particular, the ef-
fect of a crisis on structural unemployment is found to be very large in high-EPL 
countries when they are hit by extremely severe downturns (around 5 percentage 
points increase after five years). These findings appear to be mostly driven by the 
stringency of EPL for permanent contracts. Average replacement ratio and the index 
of product market regulation are also found to matter. In all cases, the impact of cri-
ses on structural unemployment appears to be significant only for countries with a 
more rigid economy than on average across OECD countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the 
main channels through which crises influence structural unemployment develop-
ments and how institutional settings can affect these adjustments. Section 2 describes 
the empirical methodology and Section 3 the data. Sections 4 and 5 detail the main 
findings and the last section concludes. 
   
1. Effect of Economic Crises on Structural Unemployment  
 
The impact of economic downturns on structural unemployment will depend on the 
drivers of the crisis: while supply shocks should affect structural unemployment de-
velopments, the latter should stay unchanged to demand-driven shocks. Economic 
downturns can also lead to an increase in structural unemployment, through hystere-
sis effects whereby the path of actual unemployment influences structural unem-
ployment (Olivier J. Blanchard and Lawrence H. Summers 1986; Laurence Ball 
2009). However, by focusing on the direct impact of economic downturn on struc-
tural unemployment, the methodology adopted in this paper does not allow to distin-
guish between supply and demand driven downturns, or to identify hysteresis effects.  
Institutional settings may magnify the impact of the downturn, or the adjust-
ments that follow (Blanchard and Justin Wolfers 2000; Giuseppe Bertola, Francine 
D. Blau, and Lawrence M. Kahn 2001; Andrea Bassanini and Romain Duval 2006). 
Past evidence suggests that the rise in the unemployment rate experienced by many 
European countries in the 1970s was driven by the interaction of exogenous shocks 
and institutions (Blanchard 2006), among which EPL is likely to play a major role. 
On the one hand, stringent EPL could dampen the initial effect of a shock by provid-
ing job security. On the other hand, it hampers the reallocation of labour and lowers 
countries’ ability to adjust to the shock. While there is only very mixed evidence on a 
direct and significant impact of EPL on aggregate unemployment (Stefano Scarpetta  
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1996; Jorgen Elmeskov, John P. Martin, and Scarpetta 1998; Julian Morgan and An-
nabelle Mourougane 2005; Bassanini and Duval 2006), stringent EPL is found to 
have robust, detrimental effects on the incidence of long-term unemployment or the 
resilience of labour markets to shocks (Bertola, Blau, and Kahn 2002; Duval, Jorgen 
Elmeskov, and Lukas Vogel 2007). As a strong EPL can also help to reduce uncer-
tainties by insuring workers, the relationship between unemployment and employ-
ment protection could be highly non-linear (Christopher A. Pissarides 2001).  
Other institutions are also likely to affect developments in structural unem-
ployment. Higher unemployment benefits, especially when available for a long dura-
tion, improve the fallback position of workers in the event that they lose their jobs. 
Such benefits may also reduce the search effectiveness of those already unemployed, 
and lower their incentives to put downward pressure on wages by competing with 
those currently employed. Either way, more generous unemployment benefits may be 
expected to lead to upward wage pressure and thereby to a rise in structural unem-
ployment. 
Finally, flexibility on product markets can facilitate the restructuration process 
including the creation and destruction of new firms following an economic downturn. 
Product market reforms may also help to loosen employment protection legislation 
through their direct positive impact on overall employment, which reduces incentives 
for incumbent to request strict employment protection legislation (Winfried Koeniger 
and Andrea Vindigni 2003; Giuseppe Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005). In addition, 
product market reforms increase the marginal employment gains that can be expected 
from a reduction in employment protection (Adriana Kugler and Giovanni Pica 
2003).  
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
 
In order to analyse the effects of economic downturns on structural unemployment a 
two-step approach is adopted. In a first step, an Autoregressive Distributive Lag 
model (ARDL) has been estimated on an unbalanced panel of annual data for 30 
OECD countries over the period 1960-2006. The sample period has been restricted to 
2006 in order to exclude the ongoing current crisis. Including only the first years of 
the current crisis would likely bias the impact estimates downward, as it will take 
time until the full effect of structural unemployment can be visible. 
The reduced-form approach used in the paper is similar to the one adopted by 
Valeire Cerra and Sweta C. Saxena (2008), Davide Furceri and Mourougane (2012) 
to assess the impact of financial crises on output and potential output, but applied to 
structural unemployment:  
 
∆   
∗ =    +    + ∑   ∆     
∗  
    + ∑            ,   
 
    +       (1)
 
where u* is structural unemployment, DOWNTURN is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 at the start of an economic downturn (see below for its construction), and 
   and    are country and time fixed effects to capture country specific characteristics 
and common shocks over time. The coefficients    and     represent the persistence 
of structural unemployment and the direct effect of downturns on the structural un- 
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employment, respectively. Given the very limited degrees of freedom the coefficients 
   and     are assumed to be the same across all countries. Impulse response func-
tions (IRFs) are obtained by simulating a shock on the downturn dummy. The shape 
of these response functions depends on the value of the    and    . For instance, the 
simultaneous response will be   , the one-year ahead cumulative response will be 
   + (   +     ), etc. In order to compute Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) over 
the medium term up-to 8 years, the number of the lags has been selected equal to 8. 
Confidence bands at 90% are derived from Monte-Carlo simulations to assess the 
significance of the results.  
Since the dependent variable is non-observable and estimated through econo-
metric techniques, the regression residuals can be thought of as having two compo-
nents. The first component is the sampling error (the difference between the true 
value of the dependent variable and its estimated value). The second component is 
the random shock that would have been obtained even if the dependent variable was 
directly observed as opposed to estimated. This would lead to an increase in the stan-
dard error of the estimates and a decrease in the t-statistics. This means that any cor-
rection to the presence of this un-measurable error term will increase the significance 
of our estimates. In most of the estimations reported, heteroscedasticity turns out not 
to be a problem. When it does, we correct using White standard errors. Finally, as 
structural unemployment is likely to be highly persistent, autocorrelation could be an 
issue. This problem is addressed by including the autoregressive terms in the estima-
tion.  
In a second step, we test whether the response of structural unemployment to 
economic downturns differs significantly depending on institutional settings: EPL, 
average replacement ratio and product market regulation. This is done by using a 
dummy (     
  ) which splits observations depending on whether the examined insti-
tutional variable is greater than the over time and over country average or not. More 
precisely the following equation has been estimated:  
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A positive    implies that changes in the NAIRU are more persistent for coun-
try with a relatively higher level of institution. Similarly a positive    means that the  
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direct impact of a downturn on changes in the NAIRU is larger for country with a 
relatively higher level of institution. An alternative approach to test non-linearity in 
the effect of downturn to the NAIRU would have been to introduce interaction terms 
between the value of institutions and respectively the dummies or the autoregressive 
terms. This would have allowed to account for the information contents of institu-
tional series, but the extremely high correlation between institutions and interactions 
and between current and lagged terms prevents the implementation of this approach.  
 
3. Data 
 
Dummies corresponding to the start of the economic downturn have been constructed 
based on cumulative output gaps to identify major economic downturns. They are 
constructed as follows: 
 
         , 
  =1  if     ,  <− 1 %  and ∑     ,  <   
    , 
 
where        >0  , 
 
         , 
  =0  otherwise, 
 
where DOWNTURN is the crisis dummy, GAP is the OECD measure of output gap 
(based on a production function approach, see Pierre-Olivier Beffy et al. 2006), and s 
is a measure of the economic downturn severity captured through output losses. In 
practice, three values have been examined: s = 10, 15 and 20%.  
The choice of these thresholds provides a balanced number of episodes be-
tween moderate downturns (downturns with cumulated decrease in output gap of 
10% or lower) and severe and very severe downturns (downturns with cumulated 
decrease in output gap of at least 15%). In particular, using this definition, 32 epi-
sodes corresponding to losses of at least 10 % have been identified, among which 16 
episodes for losses of at least 15% (8 episodes for losses of more than 20%). While 
any choice on the value of s involves some arbitrary judgement, most of the severe 
and very severe downturns can be recognised as episodes when either the global 
economy was in recession (in the yearly 1970s or 1980s following oil price shocks), 
or when individual economies were experiencing idiosyncratic recessions (such as 
the Nordic banking crises) (Figure 1). Overall, the results are qualitatively robust to 
reasonable changes in the thresholds that allow to identify a meaningful number of 
downturn episodes for the estimation. 
The construction of start-of-the-crisis dummies has two main advantages. 
First, starting dates of economic downturns can be thought of as independent from 
structural unemployment developments, limiting the risk of endogenous bias in the 
estimation (by contrast measures based on cumulative GDP growth or output gap 
would be highly endogenous and resulting estimates would likely to be biased). The 
hypothesis of exogeneity has nonetheless been tested (see below). Second, it is pos-
sible to differentiate among crises depending on their degree of severity. 
As a robustness check, a crisis dummy based on financial crises dates taken 
from Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (2008) has also been used. The dummy codes  
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the starting dates of currency and banking crises which occurred over the period 
1970 to 2006. The idea is to investigate whether financial and banking crises have a 
different impact on structural unemployment than economic downturns in general. 
Data for structural unemployment is proxied by NAIRU estimates from the 
OECD Economic Outlook database. They are derived from a Kalman filter approach 
using a price Phillips curve (Pete Richardson et al. 2000). The method combines the 
use of a price Phillips curve, an autoregressive process of order two for the unem-
ployment gap and a random walk process for structural unemployment. NAIRU and 
structural unemployment are arguably different concepts. By construction NAIRU 
are related to inflation developments, while structural unemployment can be re-
constructed from institutional data. However, in practise, both measures they tend to 
exhibit similar trend (Mourougane and Vogel 2009). The empirical analysis nonethe-
less focuses on NAIRU estimates which are available on a longer time period than 
structural unemployment series. 
As for other economic research dealing with institutional data, this analysis 
has to cope with serious data limitations, in particular their lack of reliability and of 
variability over time. For this reason, the analysis has been restricted to some institu-
tions. Data for employment protection are taken from the OECD Employment Pro-
tection Database. The employment protection legislation index is available for most 
OECD countries over a relatively long time span. It is a composite indicator ranging 
from 0 (less restrictive) to 6 (more restrictive). In practise, however, all OECD coun-
tries exhibit EPL indices below 4. In our sample, a downward trend in EPL values is 
observed over time (Figure 2), with a move toward more flexible labour markets in 
Europe particularly after 1995. This has reflected reforms for atypical contracts, 
while permanent contract legislation has remained unchanged. Despite the conver-
gence in aggregate EPL, EPL in Anglo-Saxon economies has remained on average 
lower than in continental European countries (Figure 3). Most recent data point to a 
stabilisation or a fall in EPL from 2006 to 2008 in most OECD countries. Exceptions 
are Hungary, Italy and Slovakia which exhibited a rise. 
The average replacement ratios are gross replacement rates and are taken from  
the OECD Benefit and Wages Statistics. Data are available for uneven years from  
1961 to 2007 and have been interpolated for even years. In general, countries experi- 
enced declines in the replacement rates over the years, one notable exception was  
Italy which increased unemployment replacement rate by half in 2005 (Tito Boeri  
and Pietro Garibaldi 2009). Indicators of product market regulations are constructed  
for the network industries. Like EPL, these have been derived from a bottom-up ap- 
proach, by aggregation of several institutional features. The indices range from 0  
(more flexible markets) to 6 (less flexible markets). Their construction is detailed in  
Anita Wölf et al. (2009). 
 
 
4. Evidence of a Significant Effect of Crises on Structural 
Unemployment 
 
Descriptive analysis suggests that past economic downturns have affected structural 
unemployment developments. Two points are worth noting.   
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First, although two-thirds of the episodes were characterised by a rise in struc-
tural unemployment, the remaining one-third were surprisingly followed by a fall in 
structural unemployment. This could be explained either by measurement error in the 
structural unemployment rate, or lagged effects of reforms implemented before the 
start of the economic crisis, which could have diminished the decline in structural 
unemployment following a downturn. Another explanation could be that the crisis 
triggered an impetus for structural reforms which succeeded to lower structural un-
employment (Duval and Elmeskov 2005). 
Second, steep increases in structural unemployment have been observed in the 
majority of episodes during which structural unemployment rose. In particular struc-
tural unemployment rose by 4.7 percentage points in Finland following the 1991 cri-
sis and by 3.9 percentage points in Spain after the 1979 downturn (Table 1).
  
Moving to inferential analysis, OLS was used to estimate equation (1) on an 
unbalanced panel of OECD countries over the period 1960-2006. Time and country 
fixed effects which capture shocks are found to be significant and the large R
2 sug-
gests that bias from the omission of variables is not an issue (Table 2).
 Removing 
time fixed effects from the estimations would not significantly alter the results (see 
Table A1). 
The results point to a positive and significant average impact of economic 
downturns on structural unemployment. The impulse reaction function derived from 
a one-period shock to the downturn dummy suggests that the effect would be maxi-
mal four to five years after the start of the crisis (Figure 4). The estimates are statisti-
cally significant at a 90% confidence level for most periods. The amplitude of the 
effects depends on the severity of the downturns ranging from a peak of 0.4 to 0.6 
percentage points in the case of mild crises to 1.5 percentage points for extremely 
severe downturns with output loss greater than 20 percentage points (Figure 5 and 
Table 2). In the latter case, economic crises are estimated to increase structural un-
employment by about 1 percentage point in the long run, after accounting for the 
autoregressive structure of structural unemployment. Another interesting result is that 
the crisis contemporaneous effect is statistically significant at a 5% level only for 
extremely severe crises. This suggests that changes in structural unemployment will 
only be visible after some period of time in the event of mild crises. 
Endogeneity could be a potential serious issue, biasing OLS estimates. Indeed 
the causality between structural unemployment and the occurrence of an economic 
downturn could go in both directions. Weak labour market performance, reflecting 
high structural unemployment, could trigger or be the outcome of an economic 
downturn. A linear probability model linking structural unemployment to the prob-
ability of a crisis has been estimated to investigate whether the explanatory variable 
was indeed endogenous: 
 


 
 
  
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8
0
*
8
1 ( ) 1 (
j it j it j
j j it j it
u
DOWNTURN consant F DOWNTURN P
 

  (3)
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Past values of the changes in structural unemployment are not found to affect 
the occurrence probability of a downturn (Table 3). The exogeneity assumption of 
the downturn dummy to changes in structural unemployment thus appears to be war-
ranted. 
Another possible source of bias in the estimation of equation 1 is the omission 
of non-related crisis shocks which could impinge on structural unemployment. To 
tackle this issue, equation (1) has been re-estimated accounting for oil prices (Fig-
ure 6 and Table A1, column 2).
 The results seem to be robust both in terms of the 
point estimates magnitude and in terms of significance. The inclusion of different 
institutions, namely EPL, product market regulation and the average replacement 
ratio has also been examined. The impact of downturns on structural unemployment 
remains significant, but none of the examined institutions are. 
A final test has been to check whether the result still holds when crisis epi-
sodes are restricted to banking and currency crises, as proxied by the financial 
dummy constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2008). The immediate impact of bank-
ing crises on structural unemployment is found to be significant (Figure 6 and Ta-
ble A1, column 4). Its amplitude is stronger than the effect of mild crises but smaller 
than the impact of deep economic downturns. Overall, although some differences are 
visible, the effect of financial crisis on structural unemployment is not significantly 
different from those of economic downturns in general. 
 
5. Effects of Institutions on Structural Unemployment’s 
Adjustment to an Economic Downturn 
 
The influence of institutional settings is introduced in the framework by allowing the 
dynamics and the direct impact of the economic downturn to be different whether 
institutions are more or less rigid than in the average of OECD countries. The chosen 
threshold corresponds to the observed average of institution data across countries and 
time.
 This corresponds to a value of 30% for the average replacement ratio and 2 for 
the product market regulation indicator and EPL. The use of different thresholds of 
the same order of magnitude does not markedly change the results. 
The impact of the economic downturn varies depending on institutional set-
tings (Table 4). Institutions are found to affect both the direct impact of the downturn 
and the structural unemployment’s persistence in the aftermath of the shock. In par-
ticular, economic downturns appear to increase structural unemployment signifi-
cantly in countries and in periods with rigid (above the OECD average) institutions. 
By contrast, no significant effect of economic downturns on structural unemploy-
ment is found in flexible economies for crisis of medium severity. Significance in-
creases with the severity of the crisis. As such, these results are not inconsistent with 
the estimated rise in the US structural unemployment in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, given the severity of the latter crisis. This is consistent with other 
analysis on the resilience of economies after an exogenous shock (Duval, Elmeskov, 
and Vogel 2007). 
Although all the institutions tested in the analysis appear to affect the impact 
of the downturn on structural unemployment, some differences between institutions 
are visible (Figure 7). While the shape of the response to economic downturn is simi- 
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lar in all the three cases, the magnitude differs, with a high (above the average) level 
of average replacement ratio generating the higher increase in structural unemploy-
ment. By contrast, the rise in structural unemployment in high-EPL countries, in par-
ticular high-EPL for permanent contracts, would be less pronounced (Table 5). In-
deed, when EPL for regular contracts is substituted to aggregate EPL in equation 2, 
an economic downturn is found to have a positive and marked effect on structural 
unemployment only when EPL is above the country average (Table 5, column 1), 
and the extent of the crisis impact is found of the same order. Opposite effects are 
surprisingly found when EPL for temporary contracts is substituted in the equation. 
This could reflect labour market features in OECD countries. Economies which dis-
play low EPL for temporary contracts are usually also characterised by stronger pro-
tection for regular than for temporary contracts (Figure 8). When a crisis hits the 
economy, workers on a permanent contract who lose their job will either stay unem-
ployed for a while or be offered temporary contracts which are associated with lower 
firing costs. This is likely to increase structural unemployment. 
The influence of market institutions is particularly important in situations of 
extreme severe downturns (Figure 9 and Table A2). While the rise in structural un-
employment after a deep recession (corresponding to output losses of at least 20%) is 
on average at around 1.5 percentage points at the peak, such a rise could amount to 
double this value in countries displaying high EPL. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The empirical investigations undertaken in this paper suggest that economic down-
turns usually materialise into a marked rise in the level of structural unemployment 
and this effect is likely to be magnified by stringent institutional settings. The ap-
proach adopted in the paper relies on micro-economics foundations and applies them 
to macroeconomics settings. As such, it implicitly makes an assumption on the way 
microeconomic behaviours are aggregated. Other aggregation assumptions could 
lead to different results. In particular given the heterogeneity of individual behav-
iours leading to winner and looser from reforms it is expected that the implied esti-
mated macro effect of institutions on the effect of crisis on the structural unemploy-
ment may be lower than what could be seen at a micro level. 
The findings of the paper have direct policy implications in the current eco-
nomic environment. The 2008 crisis has severely hit OECD economies, with a dra-
matic deterioration in labour market performance. In this context, governments 
should adopt measures that aim to limit long-lasting effects. This could be done 
through appropriate employment and social policies that support long-term unem-
ployed and vulnerable workers to avoid a rise in the structural unemployment. More-
over, reforms in product and labour markets could also prepare the economy to cope 
with future crises. This would include revisiting employment protection rules by sof-
tening too stringent laws, especially for permanent contracts, lowering the average 
replacement ratio and injecting more flexibility in product markets. 
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Source: Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 1 Structural Unemployment and Past Economic Downturns 
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Source: Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 1  Structural Unemployment and Past Economic Downturns (contd) 
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Source: Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 1  Structural Unemployment and Past Economic Downturns (contd) 
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Source: Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 1  Structural Unemployment and Past Economic Downturns (contd) 
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Source: Employment Protection database. 
 
Figure 2  Changes in EPL (1985-2006), Percentage Points 
 
 
 
 
Source: Employment Protection database. 
 
Figure 3  Average EPL (1985-2006) 
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Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 4  The Effects of Economic Downturns on Structural Unemployment, Percentage Points  
 (s=15) 
 
 
 
 
Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 5  The Effects of Economic Downturns on Structural Unemployment Depending on the  
  Severity of the Downturn, Percentage Points 
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Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 6  Robustness Tests, Percentage Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: EPL: Employment Protection Legislation; PMR: Product Market Regulation; AWR: Average Replacement ratio. The downturn 
dummy corresponds to s=15. 
Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 7  Effect on Structural Unemployment, Accounting for Institutions, Percentage Points 
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Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 8  EPL for Temporary Contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The authors. 
 
Figure 9  The Effects of Economic Downturns on Structural Unemployment, when EPL is Above  
 Average, Percentage Points 
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Table 1   Rise in Structural Unemployment During Severe Downturns 
 
Percentage point change after 
    1 year   4 years  10 years 
CAN 1991 0.0  0.1  -1.3 
FIN 1991  1.8 4.7 1.5 
KOR   1980  -0.1  -0.4  -1.3 
LUX 1981  0.1  0.4  0.8 
NOR   1978  0.1  0.6  1.6 
PRT 1983 -0.1  -0.4  -1.1 
ESP 1979 0.6  3.9  8.7 
TUR 1980 0.0  0.1  0.4 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
Table 2   Average Impact of Economic Downturns on Structural Unemployment 
 
s = 10  s = 15  s = 20 
u*(-1) 
1.026
(26.69)*** 
1.037
(27.13)*** 
1.028
(26.87)*** 
u*(-2) 
-0.300
(-5.47)*** 
-0.299
(-5.45)*** 
-0.287
(-5.25)*** 
u*(-3) 
0.125
(2.30)** 
0.106
(1.95)* 
0.105
(1.94)* 
u*(-4) 
-0.276
(-5.20)*** 
-0.269
(-5.05)*** 
-0.269
(-5.06)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.310 
(6.06)*** 
0.298 
(5.80)*** 
0.291 
(5.67)*** 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.132 
(-2.80)*** 
-0.129 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.129 
(-1.61)*** 
u*(-7) 
 
-0.071 
(-1.64)* 
-0.068 
(-1.56) 
-0.070 
(-1.61) 
u*(-8) 
 
0.031 
(1.04) 
0.030 
(0.95) 
0.038 
(1.21) 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.046
(1.46) 
0.070
(1.57) 
0.222
(2.79)*** 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.119
(3.74)*** 
0.104
(2.33)** 
0.214
(2.67)*** 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
-0.025
(-0.82) 
0.020
(0.49) 
0.010
(0.14) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
-0.0105
(-0.35) 
0.002
(0.05) 
-0.003
(-0.04) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.073
(-2.55)** 
-0.090
(-2.38)** 
-0.076
(-1.36) 
DOWNTURN(-5) -0.072
(-2.54)** 
-0.003
(-0.07) 
-0.072
(-1.29) 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.060
(-2.24)** 
-0.090
(-2.63)*** 
-0.059
(-1.15) 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.040
(-1.52) 
-0.053
(-1.47) 
-0.073
(-1.42) 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.016
(-0.60) 
-0.049
(-1.36) 
-0.031
(-0.60) 
R2 0.87  0.87  0.87 
N 731  731  731 
F- test country  3.63***  3.60***  3.57*** 
F- test time  2.77***  2.82***  2.91*** 
 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 3 Structural Unemployment Effect on the Downturn Occurrence Probability 
 
DOWNTURN-1 DOWNTURN-2 DOWNTURN-3 DOWNTURN-4 DOWNTURN-5 DOWNTURN-6 DOWNTURN-7 DOWNTURN-8 
-0.074 
(-2.54)** 
-0.079 
(-2.41)** 
-0.058
(-2.63)*** 
-0.054
(-2.21)** 
-0.056
(-2.46)** 
-0.039
(-2.31)** 
-0.031
(-2.01)** 
-0.050 
(-2.48)** 
u  u*(-1)  u*(-2)  u*(-3)  u*(-4)  u*(-5)  u*(-6)  u*(-7)  u*(-8) 
0.054 
(0.80) 
-0.012 
(-0.21) 
-0.035
(-0.77) 
0.029
(0.73) 
-0.062
(-1.25) 
0.094
(1.59) 
-0.015
(-0.47) 
-0.031
(-0.78) 
0.020 
(0.71) 
 
Notes: the downturn dummy corresponds to a degree of severity of 15%. T-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote signifi-
cant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4   Influence of Institutions 
 
  EPL  Product market
regulation 
Average  
replacement ratio 
HIGH 
u*(-1)  1.128
(17.38)*** 
1.241
(21.27)*** 
1.118 
(22.04)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.506
(-5.19)*** 
-0.602
(-7.33)*** 
-0.371 
(-5.13)*** 
u*(-3)  0.187
(1.93)* 
0.278
(3.37)*** 
0.055 
(0.79) 
u*(-4)  -0.259
(-2.86)*** 
-0.308
(-3.80)*** 
-0.231 
(-3.51)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.228 
(2.52)** 
0.284 
(3.65)*** 
0.341 
(5.62)*** 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.047 
(-0.51) 
-0.116 
(-1.72)* 
-0.143 
(-2.54)** 
u*(-7) 
 
-0.047 
(-0.52) 
-0.048 
(-0.81) 
-0.072 
(-1.38) 
u*(-8) 
 
-0.040 
(-0.65) 
0.025 
(0.56) 
0.008 
(0.21) 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.295
(3.36)*** 
0.098
(1.41) 
0.177 
(2.60)*** 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.262
(2.95)*** 
0.214
(3.08)*** 
0.238 
(3.45)*** 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.071
(0.81) 
0.043
(0.61) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
0.174
(1.99)** 
-0.021
(-0.31) 
-0.014 
(-0.17) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.085
(-0.97) 
-0.071
(-1.00) 
-0.091 
(-1.32) 
DOWNTURN(-5) 0.224
(2.58)*** 
-0.091
(-1.28) 
0.033 
(0.47) 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.148
(-1.70)* 
-0.112
(-1.79)* 
-0.160 
(-2.34)** 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.028
(-0.32) 
-0.067
(-1.08) 
-0.091 
(-1.32) 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.051
(-0.59) 
-0.090
(-1.45) 
-0.042 
(-0.61) 
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Table 4   Influence of Institutions (contd) 
 
  EPL  Product market
regulation 
Average  
replacement ratio 
LOW  
u*(-1)  0.708
(9.26)*** 
0.964
(22.78)*** 
0.892
(16.87)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.189
(-2.24)** 
-0.216
(-3.82)*** 
-0.173
(-2.43)** 
u*(-3)  0.211
(2.66)*** 
0.117
(2.10)** 
0.170
(2.42)** 
u*(-4)  -0.250
(-3.20)*** 
-0.267
(-4.91)*** 
-0.273
(-4.06)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.175 
(2.30)** 
0.257 
(4.81)*** 
0.194 
(2.96)*** 
u*(-6)  -0.032
(-0.45) 
-0.141
(-2.93)*** 
-0.101
(-1.65) 
u*(-7) 
 
0.059 
(0.90) 
-0.045 
(-0.99) 
-0.107 
(-1.83)* 
u*(-8) 
 
-0.055 
(-1.04) 
0.014 
(0.41) 
0.082 
(1.83)* 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.027
(0.43) 
0.064
(1.05) 
0.002
(0.03) 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
-0.005
(-0.08) 
0.014
(0.24) 
-0.001
(-0.02) 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.030
(0.59) 
-0.021
(-0.41) 
0.031
(0.58) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
-0.045
(-0.77) 
0.031
(0.60) 
0.008
(0.16) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.158
(-3.09)*** 
-0.075
(-1.68)* 
-0.089
(-1.93)* 
DOWNTURN(-5) -0.056
(-1.09) 
0.008
(0.18) 
-0.028
(-0.60) 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.131
(-2.74)*** 
-0.077
(-1.68)* 
-0.089
(-1.93)** 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.119
(-2.54)** 
-0.053
(-1.18) 
-0.048
(-1.12) 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.094
(-2.20)** 
-0.032
(-0.75) 
-0.059
(-1.42) 
R2 0.84  0.88  0.87 
N 731  731  731 
F- test country  1.22  3.65***  3.35*** 
F- test time  1.75***  2.84***  2.75*** 
 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The DOWNTURN dummy 
corresponds to s=15. Dummy for institutions have been included in the analysis, but they are not reported since they turned 
out not to be significant.  
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 5   EPL for Permanent Contracts and EPL for Temporary Contracts 
 
EPL for permanent 
contracts 
EPL for temporary 
contracts  EPL 
HIGH 
u*(-1)  1.112
(17.35)*** 
1.182
(14.87)*** 
1.128 
(17.38)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.442
(-4.59)*** 
-0.441
(-3.91)*** 
-0.506 
(-5.19)*** 
u*(-3)  0.182
(1.94)* 
0.242
(2.31)** 
0.187 
(1.93)* 
u*(-4)  -0.297
(-3.47)*** 
-0.364
(-3.81)*** 
-0.259 
(-2.86)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.289 
(3.37)*** 
0.302 
(3.14)*** 
0.228 
(2.52)** 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.088 
(-1.01) 
-0.181 
(-1.88)* 
-0.047 
(-0.51) 
u*(-7) 
 
-0.059 
(-0.70) 
0.028 
(0.30) 
-0.047 
(-0.52) 
u*(-8) 
 
-0.040 
(-0.65) 
0.037 
(0.51) 
-0.040 
(-0.65) 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.267
(3.13)*** 
-0.092
(-0.87) 
0.295 
(3.36)*** 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.324
(3.77)*** 
0.158
(1.54) 
0.262 
(2.95)*** 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.057
(0.66) 
-0.045
(-0.45) 
0.071 
(0.81) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
0.171
(2.03)** 
0.093
(0.91) 
0.174 
(1.99)** 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.121
(-1.44) 
-0.031
(-0.31) 
-0.085 
(-0.97) 
DOWNTURN(-5) 0.185
(2.23)** 
0.161
(1.62) 
0.224 
(2.58)*** 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.192
(-2.31)** 
-0.183
(-1.82)* 
-0.148 
(-1.70)* 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.044
(-0.53) 
-0.013
(-0.13) 
-0.028 
(-0.32) 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.074
(-0.89) 
-0.129
(-1.30) 
-0.051 
(-0.59) 
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Table 5   EPL for Permanent Contracts and EPL for Temporary Contracts (contd) 
 
EPL for permanent 
contracts 
EPL for temporary
contracts  EPL 
LOW 
u*(-1)  0.956
(20.31)*** 
1.006
(24.88)*** 
0.708
(9.26)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.219
(-3.44)*** 
-0.280
(-4.96)*** 
-0.189 
(-2.24)** 
u*(-3)  0.142
(2.32)** 
0.103
(1.84)* 
0.211
(2.66)*** 
u*(-4)  -0.294
(-4.96)*** 
-0.265
(-4.85)*** 
-0.250 
(-3.20)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.264 
(4.65)*** 
0.307 
(5.85)*** 
0.175 
(2.30)** 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.142 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.124 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.032 
(-0.45) 
u*(-7) 
 
-0.047 
(-1.00) 
-0.083 
(-1.86)* 
0.059 
(0.90) 
u*(-8) 
 
-0.074 
(-0.89) 
0.0258 
(0.79) 
-0.055 
(-1.04) 
DOWNTURN 
 
-0.001
(-0.02) 
0.115
(2.15)** 
0.027
(0.43) 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.009
(0.16) 
0.113
(2.09)** 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.031
(0.62) 
0.036
(0.75) 
0.030
(0.59) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
-0.028
(-0.56) 
-0.014
(-0.29) 
-0.045 
(-0.77) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.088
(-1.98)** 
-0.123
(-2.86)*** 
-0.158 
(-3.09)*** 
DOWNTURN(-5) -0.043
(-0.53) 
-0.035
(-0.81) 
-0.056 
(-1.09) 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.078
(-1.86)* 
-0.093
(-2.26)** 
-0.131 
(-2.74)*** 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.054
(-1.30) 
-0.054
(-1.32) 
-0.119 
(-2.54)** 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.041
(-1.02) 
-0.038
(-0.98) 
-0.094 
(-2.20)** 
R2  0.87 0.87  0.84 
N  491 491  491 
F- test country  268*** 3.69***  1.22 
F- test time  3.77*** 2.79***  1.75*** 
 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The DOWNTURN dummy 
corresponds to s = 15. Dummy for institutions have been included in the analysis, but they are not reported since they 
resulted to not be significant.  
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table A1   Robustness Checks 
 
S=15 and 
no time FE 
S=15, time dummies, 
country FE +oil 
shocks 
S=15,
time & country FE 
introduction of 
institutions 
(EPL, PMR, 
AWR) 
Financial DOWNTURN 
dummy 
time & country FE 
u*(-1)  1.079
(28.74)*** 
1.037
(27.13)*** 
1.071
(17.19)*** 
1.042 
(27.36)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.308
(-5.64)*** 
-0.299
(-5.45)*** 
-0.332
(-3.67)*** 
-0.304 
(-5.59)*** 
u*(-3)  0.101
(1.86)* 
0.106
(1.95)** 
-0.022
(-0.23) 
0.100 
(1.84)* 
u*(-4)  -0.267
(-5.07)*** 
-0.269
(-5.05)*** 
-0.113
(-1.21) 
-0.269 
(-5.11)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.333 
(6.56)*** 
0.298 
(5.80)*** 
0.223 
(2.62)*** 
0.289 
(5.70)*** 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.146 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.129 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.125 
(-1.69)*** 
-0.127 
(-2.73)*** 
u*(-7) 
 
-0.068 
(-1.56) 
-0.068 
(-1.56) 
-0.041 
(-0.63) 
-0.065 
(-1.51) 
u*(-8) 
 
0.058 
(1.87)* 
0.030 
(0.95) 
0.016 
(0.34) 
0.042 
(1.37) 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.142
(3.19)*** 
0.070
(1.57) 
0.187
(2.19)** 
0.171 
(4.27)*** 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.102
(2.29)** 
0.104
(2.33)*** 
0.333
(3.79)*** 
0.077 
(1.89)* 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.003
(0.08) 
0.020
(0.49) 
0.069
(0.79) 
-0.058 
(-1.43) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
-0.005
(-0.12) 
0.002
(0.05) 
0.044
(0.51) 
-0.003 
(-0.08) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.083
(-2.19)** 
-0.090
(-2.38)*** 
-0.076
(-1.11) 
0.017 
(0.40) 
DOWNTURN(-5) 0.005
(0.14) 
-0.003
(-0.19) 
0.002
(0.03) 
0.066 
(1.80)* 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.095
(-2.60)*** 
-0.090
(-2.47)*** 
-0.099
(-1.73)* 
-0.030 
(-0.94) 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.045
(-1.23) 
-0.053
(-1.47) 
-0.047
(-0.83) 
0.036 
(1.17) 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.021
(-0.57) 
-0.049
(-1.36) 
-0.030
(-0.58) 
-0.080 
(-2.54)** 
R2 0.84  0.87 0.85  0.87 
N 731  731  306  731 
 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table A2   Effect of Economic Downturns on Structural Unemployment and Severity of Crises 
 
s=10 s=15  s=20 
HIGH EPL 
u*(-1)  1.131
(18.02)*** 
1.128
(17.38)*** 
1.008
(14.79)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.481
(-5.08)*** 
-0.506
(-5.19)*** 
-0.345
(-3.54)*** 
u*(-3)  0.145
(1.53) 
0.187
(1.93)* 
0.171
(1.81)* 
u*(-4)  -0.218
(-2.47)** 
-0.259
(-2.86)*** 
-0.186
(-2.09)** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.229 
(2.59)** 
0.228 
(2.52)** 
0.101 
(1.15) 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.041 
(-0.46) 
-0.047 
(-0.51) 
-0.005 
(-0.06) 
u*(-7) 
 
-0.081 
(-0.93) 
-0.047 
(-0.52) 
-0.088 
(-1.00) 
u*(-8) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.04) 
-0.040 
(-0.65) 
0.053 
(0.88) 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.182
(3.01)*** 
0.295
(3.36)*** 
0.977
(6.70)*** 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.161
(2.62)*** 
0.262
(2.95)*** 
0.642
(3.99)*** 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.042
(0.68) 
0.071
(0.81) 
0.193
(1.20) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
0.095
(1.53) 
0.174
(1.99)** 
0.062
(0.40) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.044
(-0.70) 
-0.085
(-0.97) 
-0.494
(-3.22)*** 
DOWNTURN(-5) 0.068
(1.10) 
0.224
(2.58)*** 
-0.097
(0.62) 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.095
(-1.53) 
-0.148
(-1.70)* 
-0.165
(-1.04) 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
0.002
(0.03) 
-0.028
(-0.32) 
-0.073
(-0.46) 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.020
(-0.33) 
-0.051
(-0.59) 
0.076
(0.50) 
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Table A2   Effect of Economic Downturns on Structural Unemployment and Severity of Crises (contd) 
 
s=10 s=15  s=20 
LOW EPL 
u*(-1)  0.659
(8.43)*** 
0.708
(9.26)*** 
0.744 
(10.27)*** 
u*(-2)  -0.177
(-2.06)** 
-0.189
(-2.24)** 
-0.219 
(-2.69)*** 
u*(-3)  0.238
(2.99)*** 
0.211
(2.66)*** 
0.194 
(2.52)** 
u*(-4)  -0.253
(-3.25)*** 
-0.250
(-3.20)*** 
-0.291 
(-3.89)*** 
u*(-5) 
 
0.172 
(2.22) 
0.175 
(2.30)** 
0.175 
(2.38)** 
u*(-6) 
 
-0.032 
(-0.44) 
-0.032 
(-0.45) 
-0.104 
(-1.52) 
u*(-7) 
 
0.056 
(0.82) 
0.059 
(0.90) 
0.072 
(1.12) 
u*(-8) 
 
-0.070 
(-1.29) 
-0.055 
(-1.04) 
-0.052 
(-1.01) 
DOWNTURN 
 
0.029
(0.58) 
0.027
(0.43) 
0.166 
(1.37) 
DOWNTURN(-1) 
 
0.055
(1.10) 
-0.005
(-0.08) 
0.041 
(1.16) 
DOWNTURN(-2) 
 
0.006
(0.13) 
0.030
(0.59) 
-0.091 
(-0.68) 
DOWNTURN(-3) 
 
-0.046
(-0.96) 
-0.045
(-0.77) 
-0.120 
(-0.91) 
DOWNTURN(-4) 
 
-0.143
(-3.15)*** 
-0.158
(-3.09)*** 
-0.108 
(-1.36) 
DOWNTURN(-5) -0.123
(-2.67)*** 
-0.056
(-1.09) 
-0.123 
(-1.52) 
DOWNTURN(-6) 
 
-0.095
(-1.53)** 
-0.131
(-2.74)*** 
-0.087 
(-1.26) 
DOWNTURN(-7) 
 
-0.133
(-3.14)*** 
-0.119
(-2.54)** 
-0.150 
(-2.19)** 
DOWNTURN(-8) 
 
-0.124
(-3.03)*** 
-0.094
(-2.20)** 
-0.086 
(-1.34) 
R2  0.83 0.84  0.85 
N  491 491  491 
F- test country  1.39* 1.22  1.29 
F- test time  1.92*** 1.75***  2.06*** 
 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 